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Article Abstracts
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Draf of NASA-STD-(I)-7009, Standard For Models and Simulations.
The document represents the technical consensus of the developing group at NASA but does not yet have final NASA approval. Thousands of worker hours from many groups have already been devoted to developing consensus language acceptable to a broad community. The primary goal of this standard is to support risk-informed decisions by ensuring that the credibility of the results from models and simulations (M&S) is properly conveyed to those making critical decisions. (By “critical decisions” we mean decisions that may affect human safety or project defined mission success criteria.) The secondary goal is to assure that the credibility of the results from M&S meets the project requirements. This will reduce the risks associated with critical decisions.
This standard covers the development and operation (or execution) of the M&S, as well as the analysis and presentation of the results from the simulations. Since probabilistic technologies (PT) will normally be applied within the context of M&S, usually to support critical decisions, the Standard represents the framework in which PT must be applied for NASA. This document is a first of its kind Standard and may well be adopted in whole, or in part, by other Federal Agencies. Some of the key features of this standard are requirements and recommendations for uncertainty quantification, credibility assessment of M&S, and ways to report the M&S results to decision makers, all of which PT will readily support. If existing M&S that were not developed under terms of this Standard are subsequently applied to uses that support critical decisions, then all the requirements of this standard must be met. This may be the case for legacy M&S, or for products of research activities on M&S that have matured to the point that they are chosen to support a critical decision. Therefore, other M&S that do not yet support critical decisions may benefit from adhering to aspects of this standard when the aspects of resources and utility of M&S compliance with the Standard are considered. This standard may be also cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical requirement.
In short, the document is expected to become a far-reaching framework in which PT will be applied. No formal mechanism or time frame has yet been established for the submission of comments, so readers are advised to collect their comments, at least by page number, section, paragraph, and line numbers for later submission. Please forward any comments to Lawrence.L.Green@NASA.gov, with a copy to tallen@predictionprobe.com.
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Documents from the February 13, 2007 Meeting of the combined PTLC and PTC Board of Directors.
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- Agenda
- Executive Overview of the PTC,
by Robert Kuper, ARDEC, Picatinney Arsenal, US Army
- Implementation of Probabilistic Technology by US Army,
by Robert Kuper, ARDEC, Picatinney Arsenal, US Army
- Implementation of Probabilistic Technology by NASA,
by Bryan O'Connor, Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA Headquarters
- Implementation of Probability by Simpson, Gumpertz & Heger,
by Glenn Bell, CEO of Simpson, Gumpertz & Heger
- Status of the Technical and Business Committees,
by Dr. Suren Singhal, NASA, MSFC
- PTC Discussion Items,
by Robert Kuper, ARDEC, Picatinney Arsenal, US Army
- Minutes from PTLC and Board of Director's Meetings,
submitted by Terry Allen of PredictionProbe, secretary to PTLC, and acting secretary to Board of Directors
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